Judgment aggregation problems are a class of collective decision-making problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known collective decisionmaking problems such voting problems. A collective decision can be reached either by aggregation of individual decisions or by deliberation -allowing each decision-maker to change their individual decision in response to the individual decisions the other decision-makers made in the previous step. Impossibility results exist for judgment aggregation operators, voting operators, and judgment deliberation operators. However, while specific aggregation operators were constructed for aggregation of judgments and votes, deliberation procedures have only been studied for voting problems. Here we propose a deliberation procedure for judgment aggregation, based on movements in an undirected graph, and we study for which instances it produces a consensus. We also compare the computational complexity of our deliberation procedure with that of related judgment aggregation operators.
Introduction
Social choice aggregation methods, such as voting [32] , are of interest to artificial intelligence as methods for collective decision-making among humans and automated agents alike [2] . Judgment aggregation problems [26] are problems of aggregating individual judgments on a fixed set of logically related issues, called an agenda. Intuitively, an issue is a question that can be answered "yes" or "no", alternatively an issue is a proposition that can be accepted or rejected. Judgment aggregation has been used to model collective decision-making in multi-agent systems [39] . It is also interesting because it generalises voting, see e.g., [5, 22] , meaning that a voting problem can be represented as a judgment aggregation problem, under some mild preconditions. Voting problems are problems of choosing one option from a set of available options by aggregating agents' individual preferences over a the available options.
Aggregation methods reach a collective decision by aggregating a collection of individual decisions, called a profile, made by some agents using an aggregation operator. Another method to reach collective decisions is by deliberation: each agent starts with an individual decision which she then iteratively changes in response to the individual decisions of the other agents until all agents end up supporting the same decision, i.e., 1 until a consensus is reached. While for aggregation all individual decisions are elicited once and after the elicitation the agents can no longer change them, under deliberation an agent may change her decision numerous times, even back and forth.
List [25] considers the existence of judgment transformation functions: functions that transform one profile of individual judgments into another profile of individual judgments (possibly towards consensus) and shows that under a set of reasonable and minimal desirable conditions no transformation function can exist. Social choice aggregation theory is rife with impossibility results such as this, yet specific aggregation operators (that violate some of the desirable conditions) are proposed. There are more voting operators than judgment aggregation operators, which is unsurprising since voting is a much older discipline, but the number of judgment aggregation operators is also on the rise. Those include: quota-based rules [5] , distance-based rules [37, 28, 13, 10] , generalisations of Condorcet-consistent voting rules [30, 29, 20] , and rules based on the maximisation of some scoring function [20, 4, 40] . Deliberation and iterative consensus reaching procedures for voting problems are not many but they have been explored, e.g., [27, 24, 16, 17, 34] . In multi-agent systems these procedures are constructed over an abstract argumentation framework, e.g., [35, 19] . There are, however, to the best of our knowledge, no deliberation procedures for judgment aggregation problems. With this work we aim to change that.
We consider all possible judgments for an agenda as vertices in a graph. The existence of an edge between judgments in the graph depends on the relations between the truth-value assignments on the same issue in the connected judgments. We define three intuitive agenda graphs. We design a decentralised deliberation algorithm which models deliberation in the following way: In the first step of the algorithm, each agent chooses a vertex and lets the other agents know what she has chosen. In subsequent steps each agent independently from the other agents moves to an adjacent vertex if this move reduces his path distance to the other vertices in the profile. The agents are only allowed to move along a shortest path towards some other agent. The moving continues until a consensus is reached (i.e., when all agents end up on the same vertex). We then exploit properties of graphs to study for which subgraphs corresponding to a profile of judgments the algorithm terminates with a consensus.
Judgment aggregation operators suffer from two shortcomings: they are often irresolute, i.e., more than one collective decision is produced, and deciding if a given judgment is among the possible "winners" of the aggregation is often intractable [22, 11] . Unlike in voting, tie-breaking in judgment aggregation is not straightforward and virtually unexplored. Moreover, the set of tractable aggregation functions is very limited, exceptions being [6, 8, 12] . A deliberation procedure clearly avoids ties when it reaches a consensus, and this is one advantage of our proposal. We also show that our consensus-oriented procedure may offer some computational benefits when compared to standard judgment aggregation rules.
The motivation for our deliberation procedure is both descriptive and prescriptive. On one hand, our algorithm is meant to approximate consensus formation that happens in human societies. On the other hand, our procedure can be useful for implementing artificial agents, as producing a consensual judgment is in some cases distinctly cheaper than computing the collective opinion in one shot by a standard judgment aggregation procedure.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the judgment aggregation framework. In Section 3 we define our three agenda graphs and useful elements from graph theory within the context of these graphs. In Section 4 we give the algorithm for our deliberation procedure and the necessary conditions for the algorithm to terminate with a consensus. In Section 5 we consider sufficient conditions for termination with a consensus for each of the three agenda graphs. In Section 6 we briefly discuss the quality of the reached consensus with respect to some judgment aggregation operators and we give a computational complexity analysis of the deliberation algorithm. Lastly, in Section 7 we discuss related work and in Section 8 we make our conclusions and discuss future work.
Preliminaries
We first introduce the basic definitions of judgment aggregation.
Judgments. Let L be a set of propositional variables. An agenda A = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m } is a finite set A ⊂ L. The elements of A are called issues. A judgment is a function J : A → {0, 1} mapping each issue to either 0 (reject) or 1 (accept). We write {0, 1} A as a shorthand for A → {0, 1}, the space of all possible judgments for m issues, i.e., all sequences of length m comprised of 0s and 1s. We use J(ϕ) to denote the value assigned to ϕ ∈ A. The number of issues on which two judgments differ, which is the Hamming distance between these judgments, is defined as
With each agenda we associate a constraint Γ ∈ L A , where L A is the set of well formed formulas constructed with variables from A and the logic connectives ¬ (negation), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), and → (implication). For Γ ∈ L A we define recursively the notion of a judgment from {0, 1}
A being rational for Γ:
• J |= ϕ for ϕ ∈ A iff J(ϕ) = 1;
• J |= ¬Γ iff it is not the case that J |= Γ;
The formula Γ is assumed to not be a contradiction. For a given Γ ∈ L A , we define J A,Γ = {J ∈ {0, 1} A | J |= Γ} to be the set of all rational judgments for A and Γ.
Agents and profiles. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents.
A,Γ is a list of rational judgments, one for each agent. We denote P [i] = J i and P −i = (J 1 , . . . , J i−1 , J i+1 , . . . , J n ). Further let {P } be the set of all distinct judgments that are in P . We often abuse notation and write J i ∈ P when P [i] = J i . We reserve subscripted judgments, e.g., J i , to denote judgments that belong to some profile and the superscripted judgments, e.g., J a , J b , to denote rational judgments that may not belong to some profile. A profile is unanimous if {P } = {J}, for some J ∈ J A,Γ .
Example 1
The quintessential example in judgment aggregation is the "doctrinal paradox" which is described with A = {ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ϕ 3 } and Γ = (ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ) ↔ ϕ 3 . The 
Agenda Graphs
Given an agenda A and constraints Γ we define three agenda graphs G A,Γ = V, E : the Hamming graph G 
That is, G h A,Γ is the graph over all possible (not necessarily rational!) judgments, that connects vertices which differ on exactly one issue. G m A,Γ is the graph over all rational judgments, where two vertices are adjacent iff they cannot be "reconciled" without altering on one of the issues on which they agree. G c A,Γ is the fully connected graph over all the rational judgments. The agenda graphs for the doctrinal paradox of Example 1 are shown in Figure 2 .
We use d to denote the path distance on an agenda graph G A,Γ . The path distance on G c A,Γ is also known as the drastic distance: the distance between two judgments is 0 if they are the same on all issues and 1 if they differ on at least one issue. The path distance on G h A,Γ is the Hamming distance, and the path distance on G m A,Γ is the Model distance introduced and formally characterized in [10] . Recall that a path distance on a graph G A,Γ , as on any graph, is a distance function in the true sense since for every
The V ′ -induced subgraph of a graph G is the graph G ′ ⊆ G with vertices V ′ and edges E ′ which satisfies that, for every pair of vertices in V ′ , they are adjacent in G iff they are adjacent in G ′ . We make use of the "geometry" of the induced subgraph of the judgments from a profile of G A,Γ and therefore we define some useful concepts. For a given agenda graph G A,Γ = V, E and agents N = 1, 2, . . . , n we define the following concepts, following the terminology from graph theory [36] . The interval between a pair of vertices in J,
, is the set of all the judgments on all the shortest paths in G A,Γ from J to J ′ . A subset S ⊆ V is convex if it is closed under I A,Γ , namely when it includes all shortest paths between two vertices in S. The convex hull of P on G A,Γ , denoted CH(P ), is the smallest convex subset of V (G A,Γ ) that contains P . The eccentricity of a judgment J in S ⊆ V , e S (J) = max{d(J,
i.e., the farthest that J gets from any other judgment in S. A diameter of a set S ⊆ V is mx d (S) = max{e S (J) | J ∈ V }, namely the maximal eccentricity of a vertex in S. All judgments for which mx d (S) = e S (J) are called peripheral judgments for S. For S = {P } we call these judgments peripheral judgments of a profile P . If for two judgments J, J ′ it holds that d(J, J ′ ) = mx d (P ), then these are called antipodal judgments of a profile P .
We have defined the convex hull of P because we will build our deliberation algorithm on the principle of only allowing the agents to move from their current judgment to an adjacent judgment in the hull of P . By doing this we ensure that the agents do not disperse away from each other.
Proposition 1 For an agenda graph
Proof This property follows from the fact that CH is a finitary closure operator [36, p. 6, Theorem 1.3]. Thus, for the convex hull CH(P ), it holds that if S ⊆ CH(P ), then CH(S) ⊆ CH(CH(P )), and CH(CH(P )) = CH(P ).
Definition 1 We say that the profile
The doctrinal paradox profile from Example 1 is a 4-cycle in G m A,Γ , and it is a 6-cycle in G h A,Γ , as can be inferred from Figure 2 . We make the following observation.
Observation 2 No profile
This exclusion of 3-cycles is due to the betweenness property of path distances: if
Definition 2 An interval
I A,Γ [J, J ′ ] is ǫ-connected in G A,Γ if
the maximal path distance between two adjacent rational judgments in the I
While every interval in G 
Deliberation Algorithm
Collective opinions in human societies are often formed not in one step, but rather in an intricate process that involves mutual information exchange, argumentation, persuasion, and opinion revision. Typically, social agents are motivated by two somewhat
Algorithm 1: Deliberation algorithm conflicting needs: on one hand, they want to form a unified stance with a significant enough part of the community; on the other hand, they do not want to concede too much of their own opinion. Here, we try to mimic this kind of behaviour -obviously, in a very simplified way. To this end, we design a deliberation algorithm, Algorithm 1, based on an agenda graph G A,Γ . As it is standard in judgment aggregation, we assume that the agents can only chose rational judgments at each step of the deliberation. Each agent finds a node in the graph that represents her judgment with respect to the agenda A and constraints Γ and in the first step of the deliberation procedure announces which node she has chosen. Two or more agents may choose the same node. At each subsequent step, the agents try (in parallel) to "move" to an adjacent node along some shortest path towards the other agents. A move is possible if and only if the adjacent judgment is rational and it brings the agent closer to the rest of the profile, i.e., it decreases its aggregate path distance to the other judgments. More precisely, an agent i ∈ N will move from
, where d is a path distance for a given G A,Γ . Given a choice between two moves the agent chooses the one which better reduces the distance to the rest of the profile. If more than one move reduces the distance to the same extent, the agent chooses non-deterministically. The agents continue moving along the nodes of G A,Γ until no agent in the profile can move, or all of the agents "sit" on the same node, namely until a consensus is reached. In Algorithm 1, send(J i , j) informs agent j ∈ N that agent i ∈ N has chosen to move to node J i ∈ V , while receive(J j , i) denotes that the agent i ∈ N has been informed that agent j ∈ N has chosen to move to node J j ∈ V . To ease readability we
We call D(i, J, P ) the distance of J to the profile P −i . In Algorithm 1, at each iteration t, MOVES is the set of judgments that are strictly closer to P than the current judgment Ji.
Note that the algorithm is fully decentralised, in the sense that there is no need for any central authority to take over the deliberation at any point of the process.
The starting profile P 0 collects the initial individual opinions of the agents. That is, it is the profile that would be aggregated under classical one-step social choice. We say that the algorithm reaches consensus J for P 0 , if it terminates starting from P 0 by returning the unanimous profile P = J n . We first observe a necessary condition for reaching consensus.
Proposition 3 If Algorithm 1 reaches consensus, then
Proof Assume that the algorithm terminates with a J * -unanimous P at some t. In each t ′ < t, every agent either keeps her own judgment P [i], or moves to a new J ∈ JA,Γ with d(P [i], J) = 1. Since a J * is reached by every agent, there must exist a 1-connected path between any two judgments in P 0 . Thus P 0 must be 1-connected.
Note also that if P 0 is ǫ-connected, so is P at any step t > 0. The interesting question is: what are the sufficient conditions for reaching consensus by Algorithm 1? We address the question in Section 5.
Reaching Consensus
In this section, we examine the sufficient conditions for reaching consensus by Algorithm 1. We begin by looking at the deliberation over the complete agenda graph G Proof On G c A,Γ , the path distance dc between any two judgments that are different is 1. Let J be the plurality judgment in P ∈ J n A,Γ , selected by k agents. For every Ji = J = Jj , we have
Deliberation with G
, so the agents selecting J will not revise their judgments. Moreover, switching from Jj to J decreases the distance to P−j most, so all the other agents will switch to J in the first iteration.
What about starting profiles with several plurality judgments? It turns out that they converge towards consensus under reasonable conditions.
Theorem 5 If N consists of an odd number of agents, then Algorithm 1 probabilistically reaches consensus, i.e., it reaches consensus with probability 1.
Proof If there is a single plurality judgment in P , then the algorithm converges in one step. If two or more judgments J 1 , . . . , J k ∈ JA,Γ are favoured by the highest number of agents, then those agents swap nondeterministically between J 1 , . . . , J k , and the other agents move to one of J 1 , . . . , J k . In the next round, the same argument applies. Eventually, P converges either to the unanimous profile P ′ such that {P ′ } = {J} for some J ∈ {J 1 , . . . , J k }, or to a profile P ′′ such that {P ′′ } = {J 1 , . . . , J m } for an odd m, each favoured by the same amount of agents. From then on, the agents keep swapping judgments until one judgment gets plurality in the profile, and wins in the next round. Formally, let MOVESi,t be the set of moves available to agent i at the step t of Algorithm 1. We assume that there is some δ > 0 such that, for each step t, agent i selects judgment J ∈ MOVESi,t with probability pi(J) ≥ δ. Then, there exists δ ′ > 0 such that the probability of all the agents "hitting" a profile with no plurality in the next round is at most 1 − δ ′ . Hence, the probability that the profile stays with no plurality in m steps is at most (1 − δ ′ ) m , which converges to 0 as m increases.
The Algorithm 1 has good convergence properties on G c A,Γ but the consensus it reaches is limited to the judgments that are already in the starting profile. On the Hamming and Model agenda graphs Algorithm 1 surpasses this limitation. However, its convergence becomes a subtler issue. We start with a negative result. Let us call equidistant those profiles P such that for any
Deliberation with G
Proposition 6 Consider N = {1, 2, 3} agents and a 1-connected P 0 . If Algorithm 1 reaches a P that is an equidistant k-cycle, then Algorithm 1 will not terminate with a consensus.
Proof If P is an equidistant k-cycle then no agent can reduce the distance to one agent by 1 without increasing the distance to the other agent by 1. Thus no agent has a possible move.
Note that the same applies to some non-equidistant k-cycles. For example, the profile in Figure 4 is not equidistant, but it is easy to check that each agent has empty set of moves.
3-agent profiles that form a simple cycle are problematic because an agent may not be able to get closer to one of the other agents without distancing itself from the third. For profiles of more than three agents that form a simple cycle, these cannot be equidistant, and this is no longer a problem. P is a (1-connected) k-cycle for n > 3 agents at step t of Algorithm 1, then the set MOVES at t is nonempty for some agent in N .
Lemma 7 If
Proof Take any judgment P [i] which is peripheral in CH(P ), and consider its antipodal judgment P [j]. Let p1, p2 be the two paths from P [i] to P [j] in CH(P ), and let Jm ∈ CH(P ) be the node adjacent to P
Let us consider the case of a 1-connected P 0 for |N | > 3. Let P be the profile produced by Algorithm 1 at step t ≥ 0, and let P ′ be the profile produced by Algorithm 1 at step t + 1. We begin by showing that for graphs in which no judgment has a degree higher than 2, it is never the case that P = P ′ , i.e., there exist at least one agent for which MOVES = ∅ for P .
Lemma 8
Let P be a profile for n > 3 agents, produced by Algorithm 1 at step t ≥ 0, and let P ′ be the profile produced by Algorithm 1 at step t + 1. Assume that P is 1-connected on GA,Γ. If the CH(P ) induced subgraph of GA,Γ is such that no vertex in it has a degree higher than two, and mx d (P ) > 1, then P = P ′ .
Proof
We show that at least the agent i ∈ N with a peripheral judgment for P has a possible move in P . . There are exactly two shortest paths connecting them: p1 and p2. All other profile judgments P [r] are: either on p1, or on p2, or have a shortest path to P [j] that intersects either p1 or p2, possibly both. We can apply the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 7. Consider J ∈ CH(P ) adjacent to P [i] on p1 and J ′ ∈ CH(P ) adjacent to
or whose shortest path to P [j] intersects p2, but does not intersect p1. If there are more agents r than agents s, then J ∈ MOVES, otherwise J ′ ∈ MOVES. If there are exactly as many agents r as agents s, then both J ∈ MOVES and
Observe that if the CH(P 0 ) induced subgraph on GA,Γ is such that every vertex in it is of degree at most two, then for every subsequently constructed P in Algorithm 1, it will hold that the CH(P ) induced subgraph on GA,Γ is such that every vertex in it is of degree at most two. This is due to the fact that, at each step of Algorithm 1, the agents can only chose judgments from the CH(P 0 ). From Observation 2 we know that a {P } induced subgraph of G 
Corollary 9
Let P be a profile produced in Algorithm 1 at step t ≥ 0 and let P ′ be profile produced in Algorithm 1 at step t + 1. Assume that P is 1-connected on GA,Γ. If the CH(P ) induced subgraph of GA,Γ is a tree, and mx d (P ) > 1, then P = P ′ .
Proof The proof follows from the Case a. of the proof of Lemma 8 and the observation that: all the subgraphs of a tree are trees, and the peripheral vertices of a tree have a degree 1.
We now need to show that not only the profile changes in each iteration, it also changes towards a consensus.
From Proposition 1 we have that mx d (CH(P )) does not increase with each step of the Algorithm 1. It is possible that mx d (CH(P )) = mx d (CH(P ′ )) for P ′ being constructed immediately after P in Algorithm 1. From the proof of Lemma 8 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 10 Let P ∈ J n A,Γ be a profile produced in Algorithm 1 at step t ≥ 0 and let P ′ ∈ J n A,Γ be profile produced in Algorithm 1 at step t + 1. If {P } = {P ′ }, then the {P } induced graph of GA,Γ has at least one k-cycle, where 2m + 2 ≥ k ≥ 2m.
Clearly if the agents whose judgments are antipodal in P can choose to move towards each other via two different shortest paths between their judgments causing {P } = {P ′ }. These agents however, also have the possibility to chose to move towards each other on the same shortest path between their judgments. As soon as two agents use the same shortest path, the k-cycle will be broken in the next step of the algorithm and {P } = {P ′ }. Let us consider the case when mx d (P ) = 1.
Lemma 11
Let P be a 1-connected profile for n > 3 agents at step t with mx d (P ) = 1 and let P ′ be a profile obtain from it by Algorithm 1 at step t + 1. If n is odd then {P } = {P ′ }.
Proof
In this case the Algorithm 1 behaves as on the G c A,Γ graph, see Theorems 4 and 5, except the P induced subgraf of GA,Γ will have no 3-cycles (or any size cycles since mx d (P ) = 1). Namely, if there is one plurality judgment J in P , all the agents can reach it, because mx d (P ) = 1 and P is 1-connected. Consequently {P ′ } = 1. If more than one plurality judgment exists, the agents whose judgment is this plurality judgment will not have a move, while and all the other agents will move to their choice of a plurality judgment. If n is odd P ′ will have exactly one plurality judgment and the profile P ′′ constructed by Algorithm 1 in step t + 1 is a consensus. If however n is even, as with G c A,Γ , P can be such that half of the agents have a judgment J, while the other half have an adjacent judgments J ′ . Namely {P } = {J, J ′ } and d(J, J ′ ) = 1. If such P is reached the Algorithm 1 forces the agents to infinitely "swap" between J and J ′ .
Lemma 12
Assume an odd number of agent n > 3. that in the P induced subgraph on GA,Γ each vertex has a degree at most 2. Let P ∈ J n A,Γ be s.t. CH(P ) has at least one k-cycle for k > 3. Let pi(J) > 0 be the probability that an agent i will choose possible move J from the set moves at a step t1 in the Algorithm 1. Then the algorithm will reach a point t2 > t1 where P ′ ∈ J n A,Γ is obtained s.t. CH(P ) ⊂ CH(P ′ ) with probability 1.
Proof If a profile P ′′ is reached such that all antipodal judgments have degree two, it is sufficient that only one antipodal pair "breaks" the cycle for a profile P ′ to be reached. To do so, two agents with antipodal judgments have to chose to move along the same path towards each other. Consider a pair of antipodal judgments in P , P [i] and P [j] . Assume that at the non-deterministic step of the algorithm there exists a probability 1 > pi(J) > 0 that the agent i selects J ∈ MOVES that is on a shortest path p between P [i] and P [j] and probability pi(J ′ ) = 1 − pi(J) that she selects J ′ ∈ MOVES that is on a different path q between P [i] and P [j]. Similarly, let those probabilities be 1 > pj(J ′′ ) > 0 that agent j selects to move to J ′′ on path p and pj(J ′′′ ) = 1 − pj(J ′′ ) for the probability that j moves to J ′′′ on some other path q' (q and q' may not be the same). Since the agents decide on their moves independently, the probability that agent i will chose the same path as j is pi(J) · pj(J ′′ ) > 0. Since the two peripheral judgments J[i] and J[j] are no longer part of the new profile P ′ , {P ′ } ⊂ CH(P ) and from Corollary 10 we get that CH(P ) ⊂ CH(P ′ ) is reached after a finite time with probability 1.
Let us call Class A for GA,Γ the set of all CH(P ) induced subgraphs of GA,Γ that are tree graphs. Let us call Class B for GA,Γ the set of all CH(P ) induced subgraphs of GA,Γ whose vertices have a degree of at most 1. We can now state the following theorem whose proof follows from Lemma 8, Corollary 10, Corollary 9, Lemma 11 and Lemma 12. 
Properties of Consensus
In this section, we compare the output and performance of our deliberation procedure to those of standard distance-based judgment aggregation rules. We first discuss the "quality" of the consensual decision. Then, we look at the computational complexity of the procedure.
Consensus Quality
Distance-based judgment aggregation [28, 39, 20, 18] combines an algebraic aggregation function ⋆ with a distance function d (not necessarily a path distance in some agenda graph) in order to select the collective opinion that is closest to the given profile. Given P ∈ J n A,Γ , the distancebased aggregation function
Natural questions to ask are:
• How does Algorithm 1 perform in comparison to F d,Σ when d is a path distance in an agenda graph?
• How do the collective judgments F d,Σ (P 0 ) compare to the consensus judgment reached by Algorithm 1 for a given starting profile P 0 ?
The questions cannot be fully explored within the scope of this paper. However, we establish some initial properties below. A property generally deemed desirable in judgment aggregation is that of propositional unanimity [20, 39, 15] . Propositional unanimity requires that, if every agent in profile P has the same value for some issue ϕ ∈ A, then the same value for ϕ ∈ A shows up either in at least one of the judgments in F d,⋆ (weak unanimity) or in all of the judgments in F d,⋆ (strong unanimity). It is interesting to note that the most popular distance based judgment aggregation rule F d h ,Σ (i.e., the one based on the sum of Hamming distances) does not satisfy even the weak version of the property [38] . The same applies to F dm,Σ and F dc,Σ [21] . In this respect, consensus behaves better. A big advantage of one-shot distance-based aggregation F d,Σ is that it produces output (a winner or winners) on any profile P 0 , while our Algorithm 1 is more restricted in this respect. As we have seen, a necessary condition for successful termination of Algorithm 1 is that P 0 is 1-connected. Sufficient conditions are even more restrictive. Still, Proposition 14 demonstrates that, when Algorithm 1 reaches a consensus, it is structurally "better behaved" then a distancebased judgment aggregation rule for the most popular approach based on the sum of Hamming distances. In the next subsection we show that Algorithm 1 is also "better behaved" in the sense of computational complexity.
Proposition 14 If Algorithm 1 terminates with a consensus on

Complexity of Reaching Consensus
An important drawback of distance-based judgment aggregation is the computational complexity of producing the output, i.e., the winning judgment or judgments. The winner determination problem for F d h ,Σ is known to be Θ p 2 -complete [13] , and the result extends to most other distances d and aggregation functions * [18] . How does it work for the deliberation procedure formalized with Algorithm 1?
We have shown that the algorithm reaches consensus for an odd number n > 3 of agents on 1-connected, not equidistant profiles. How costly is it to reach the consensus? On G c A,Γ , it is evident that Algorithm 1 performs well, but the resulting consensuses are not very exciting. For the G m A,Γ graph, the consensus-friendly attitude does not earn much in terms of computational complexity, when compared to F dm,Σ . For each P [i], we need to find every J ∈ JA,Γ s.t. there is no rational judgment between P [i] and J. It is not difficult to show, by a reduction to coSAT, that checking whether there is no rational judgment between two rational judgments is a coNP-complete problem. This has to be repeated for multiple candidate judgments to compute the set MOVES, and on top of that with every iteration of the algorithm. As a consequence, we get the following. 
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We conjecture that the problem is actually Θ P 2 -complete. Note that the hardness result is not really due to the deliberation procedure, but rather due to the inherent complexity of computing dm, which requires to determine (non)existence of particular rational judgments, i.e., to solve the Boolean co-satisfiability problem.
In contrast, the Hamming distance d h can be always computed efficiently. Consequently, when Algorithm 1 reaches a consensus on G h A,Γ , it is also "better behaved" computationally than the distance-based judgment aggregation rule F d h ,Σ . We demonstrate it formally below.
Proposition 17 For
G h A,Γ ,
a single iteration of Algorithm 1 runs in deterministic polynomial time.
Proof Follows from the fact that the set MOVES can be constructed by checking at most |A| candidate judgments.
By Corollary 10, if the CH(P 0 ) induced subgraph of G h A,Γ has no cycles, then CH(P ) is strictly shrinking with each non-terminating step t. In consequence, if Algorithm 1 reaches consensus for such P 0 , then it does so in polynomially many steps. However, in case of cycles in the CH(P 0 ) induced graph in G h A,Γ , the algorithm may run into such a cycle and take some time until the agents "stray" from the loop. When it happens, any judgment occurring on the loop can be the consensus. Using this observation, we propose the following modification of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2:
Same as Algorithm 1, only it stops the deliberation when {Pt} = {P t ′ } for some t > t ′ , and nondeterministically chooses one J ∈ {P } as the consensus, producing in the next step Pt+1 with {Pt+1} = {J}.
Unlike Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 avoids looping and waiting until two or more agents "move" in the same direction. It also avoids infinite loops in the case of profiles with evenly many agents. On the other hand, Algorithm 2 is no longer decentralised, which is a clear disadvantage. We suggest that it can be treated as a technical variant of Algorithm 1 that potentially reduces its running time by employing a trusted third party which simulates probabilistic convergence of the profile in Algorithm 1 by one-step nondeterministic choice in Algorithm 2. The following formal results, which are straightforward consequences of our analysis above, justify the suggestion. Lastly, let us observe that checking whether P 0 is equidistant can be done in linear time of the number of agents. For a graph G, determining if it has a simple cycle of size k, for k fixed, is a polynomial time problem over the size of G [1], however we do not generate the full GA,Γ when (or before) we run the deliberation algorithm.
Theorem 18
Related Work
List [25] considered judgment transformation functions τ : J n A,Γ → ({0, 1}
A ) n as means to building deliberation procedures for judgment aggregation problems. He showed that for a set of desirable properties no transformation functions exists. Such impossibility results exist for judgment aggregation functions, however, by relaxing some of the properties, specific judgment aggregation operators have been constructed: quota-based rules [5] , distance-based rules [37, 28, 13, 10] , generalisations of Condorcet-consistent voting rules [30, 29, 20] , and rules based on the maximisation of some scoring function [20, 4, 40] . To the best of our knowledge, specific deliberation procedures for judgment aggregation problems have not been proposed in the literature.
List [25] argues that the desirable conditions for judgment transformation functions should satisfy the following properties: universal domain, rational co-domain, consensus preservation, minimal relevance, and independence. Universal domain is satisfied when the transformation function accepts as admissible input any possible profile of rational judgments. Rational codomain is satisfied when the function always outputs a profile of rational judgments. Consensus preservation is satisfied when τ always maps unanimous profiles into themselves. Minimal relevance is a weak property. It is satisfied when for each P [i] there exists a profile P ′ to which P can be transformed such that
. In other words, the transformation function should be such that it does not allow one agent to never change her judgment regardless of what the other profile judgments are. Lastly independence is satisfied when for each agenda issue, J ′ i (ϕ) depends only on J(ϕ), and not on J(φ) for some other φ ∈ A;
. Each step of Algorithm 1 can be seen as a (distributed) function that transforms an input profile into an output profile, namely as a List judgment transformation function. Given a profile P ∈ JA,Γ, let
We can define the transformation function τ d that maps a profile P ∈ J A,Γ because profiles on this graph do not always satisfy the necessary conditions for termination with a consensus. The rational co-domain and the consensus preservation properties are also trivially satisfied. It is not difficult to show that the minimal relevance property is also satisfied. Independence is the desirable property that is violated, and in fact List [25] argues that relaxing independence is the most plausible path towards avoiding the impossibility result.
In voting, deliberation and iterative consensus have been studied, although perhaps not axiomatically. As most similar with our work we distinguish [17] and [14] . Voting problems can be represented as judgment aggregation problems, see e.g., [5, 22] , therefore it is possible to compare these works with ours. First we show how voting problems are represented in judgment aggregation.
A voting problem is specified with a set of agents N and a set of candidate options O = {x1, x2, . . . , xm}. Let O be the set of all total, transitive, and antisymmetric orders over the elements of O. A vote ≻ is an element of O and a voting profile is a collection of votes, one for each agent in N . The preference agenda Ao is constructed by representing each pair of options xi and xj, where i < j with an issue xiP xj. The constraint Γtr is the transitivity constraint defined as Γtr =
obtain a rational judgment J≻ such that J≻(xiP xj) = 1 iff xi ≻ xj and J≻(xiP xj) = 0 iff xj ≻ xi.
A Condorcet winner for a voting profile, when it exists, is the option that wins the majority of pairwise comparison for every other option in O, see e.g., [32] . The corresponding concept in the judgment aggregation representation of a voting problem is called majority consistency. A judgment profile is majority-consistent if the judgment obtained by taking the value for each issue assigned by a strict majority of agents in the profile is rational. The doctrinal paradox profile from Example 1 is not majority-consistent. It was shown [22, 31] that if a judgment profile on the preference agenda is majority-consistent, then the corresponding voting profile has a Condorcet winner.
Hassanzadeh et al [17] consider an iterative consensus algorithm for voting profiles. In their algorithm, each agent is allowed to (simultaneously with other agents) move from vote ≻i to vote ≻ if she can flip the order of two adjacent options without violating transitivity. This corresponds to the agents moving to an adjacent judgment in the agenda graph G h Ao,Γtr . Hassanzadeh et al consider the majority graph for a voting profile (for an odd number of agents): the vertices in this directed graph are the elements of O and there is an edge from xi to xj if there are more agents in the profile who prefer xi to xj than agents who prefer xj to xi. The majority graph corresponds to a judgment J ∈ JA o ,Γtr for which J(xiP xj) = v, v ∈ {0, 1} if there is a strict majority of agents r ∈ N for which Jr(xiP xj) = v, Jr = P [r]. Hassanzadeh et al show that their algorithm terminates with a consensus on the Condorcet winner when the majoritarian graph has no cycles. If the majority graph of a voting profile has no cycles, then the voting profile has a Condorcet winner.
Goel and Lee [14] consider a deliberation procedure in which the agents "move" along adjacent vertices along (what corresponds to) the graph G m A,Γ . They do not commit to the nature of their vertices, so they are not exactly judgments or alternatives, just allowed options for deliberation. In their algorithm not all agents move individually, but three agents at a time first reach a consensus and then all three move to the consensus option in the graph. Goel and Lee consider line graphs, graphs in which two vertices have degree 1 and all other vertices have degree 2, and show that the consensus produced by their algorithm is the generalised median. Namely, if the options in their algorithms were judgments from JA,Γ the consensus their algorithm reaches for these graphs is an approximation of the function F dm,Σ . Both [17] and [14] offer interesting directions for future study in context of our algorithm: to consider the profiles that have a Condorcet winner (see e.g., [22] for the concept of Condorcet winner in judgment aggregation) and to consider triadic deliberation, allowing three agents to coordinate their moves with respect to each other and then see when a consensus emerges.
It is an open question of how our algorithm would perform on the special case of voting problems represented in judgment aggregation. The G h Ao,Γtr graph on the preference agenda has a more regular topology in comparison to general judgment aggregation problems. For example, for an agenda of three options, the graph G vertices and each of these vertices has a degree |O| − 1. We leave for future work the study of whether our algorithm terminates for voting profiles. In particular, we conjecture that the Algorithm 1 for an odd number of agents will converge on the Condorcet winner in the case of voting profiles from the single crossing domain [3] , also studied in judgment aggregation [7] . This is because profiles in this domain would have a hull whose induced graph is a line on G h Ao,Γtr .
Lastly, we must mention [33] . Obraztsova et al [33] consider a graph similar to our Hamming agenda graph. They work with preferences, not judgments, but most importantly, the vertices of their graph are elements of (what would correspond to) J n A,Γ , i.e., the vertices are profiles of votes. There exists a connection between two profiles if one profile can be obtained from the other by making exactly one swap between adjacent options in one vote. Obraztsova et al [33] study the properties of voting rules with respect to the "geometry" of the profiles in their graph.
Conclusions
We propose a decentralised algorithm for deliberation on judgment aggregation problems. Since judgment aggregation is an abstract framework, it allows for other social choice aggregation problems, such as voting, to be represented in it, see e.g., [23] for a recent overview. We study the termination conditions for this algorithm and its complexity properties.
For reaching a consensus our algorithm exploits the topology of a graph -all available judgments that the agents can chose from are vertices in a graph and the algorithm models moves along adjacent judgments in the graph. We define three intuitive graphs that can be constructed for a set of rational judgments JA,Γ: the complete, the Hamming and the model agenda graph G If the agents initially chose judgments such that the convex hull of the profile of these judgments induces a subgraph of G h A,Γ , or G m A,Γ in which each vertex has a degree of at most 2, then our algorithm probabilistically terminates with a consensus for an odd number of (more than 3) agents.
The list of profiles we give here, for which Algorithm 1 terminates with a consensus, is clearly not exhaustive. For example, it is easy to show that, for an odd number of agents, Algorithm 1 terminates with a consensus if the CH(P 0 ) induced subgraph of G h A,Γ , or G m A,Γ , is such that it contains only k-cycles, where k = 2 · mx d (P 0 ) + 1. This is because for such profiles there exists at least one pair of antipodal judgments with degree no more than 2 who will have a nonempty set MOVES. An immediate direction for future work is to strengthen our results with other classes of consensus terminating agenda graph topologies, particularly those corresponding to profiles on the preference agenda (and transitivity constraints).
A step of our algorithm implements a judgment profile transformation function of the type defined in [25] . List [25] gives an impossibility characterisation of such functions. Our function "escapes" this impossibility result by not satisfying the independence property on all agenda graphs and the universal domain on G , sometimes all the adjacent judgments to a rational judgment J are not rational and thus not allowed to move to. In our future work we aim to explore modifications of the algorithm allowing the agents to make "longer" moves, i.e., to "jump over" a vertex that is not a rational judgment.
In Section 6 we gave two results with respect to the quality of the consensus reached by Algorithm 1 with respect to the widely used distance-based aggregation function F d h ,Σ . This function F d h ,Σ is also known as the median aggregation rule and it is widely used in many domains, e.g., generalises the Kemeny voting rule, see [22] , and for measuring dissimilarity between concepts in ontologies [9] . We merely scratched the surface of this consensus quality analysis and this line of research merits further attention.
Lastly, a more longterm goal for our future work is to explore versions of deliberation on an agenda graph where the agents do not try to move to reduce the path distance to all of the other agents, but only to their neighbours in a given social network, or as in [14] , to two randomly selected two agents.
